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Response to my Commentator
DAVID HITCHCOCK
Department of Philosophy
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario
Canada L8S 4K1
hitchckd@mcmaster.ca

Brian MacPherson’s summary and framing of my position give me an opportunity to
clarify it.
First, I do not accept a division of arguments into deductive and nondeductive arguments. Rather, inferences in arguments of all stripes are to be
appraised by whether their conclusion follows from the given reasons, either
necessarily or with some sort of modal qualifier like ‘probably’ or ‘presumably’ or
‘possibly’.
Second, I would not identify the material consequence relation as I define it
with one in which the implicatum follows deductively from the implicanta. Material
consequence as I define it is broader than deductive consequence as ordinarily
understood: a conclusion follows deductively if and only if it follows in virtue of the
meaning of the premises, but it can follow materially in virtue of laws of nature or
contingent facts about the world.
Third, my account of material consequence is an existential generalization:
there must be at least one covering generalization of the argument with neither
actual nor hypothetical counter-examples. In general, there is more than one
covering generalization of any argument, typically many more than one–depending
on which components of the associated conditional one generalizes over and on the
range of each variable. So it is not a question of whether the covering generalization
of an argument lacks counter-examples but of whether a covering generalization of
the argument lacks them.
Fourth, I do not conceive of instances of a generalization as substitution
instances. Substitutional conceptions of consequence involve substituting a
grammatically parallel content expression for a given content expression. My
conception of consequence uses schemata. I have not clarified how instances of
schemata are to be constructed, but I would not like to restrict them to the
resources of a given language. If there are actual or hypothetical states of affairs that
would make the existential quantification of the antecedent of a covering
generalization true, then there is an instance of the covering generalization to be
considered. If the language lacks the resources to express this instance, then the
language should be enriched so that it has the needed expressive resources.
With those clarifications, I am happy to agree with MacPherson that there are
many good arguments where the conclusion is not a consequence of the premises,
either formally or materially. However, I believe that my account of material
consequence can be extended to cover such arguments, by allowing inferenceMohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-2.

DAVID HITCHCOCK
licensing covering generalizations to hold for the most part or ceteris paribus or
even sometimes. For example, the conclusion of a good argument to the best
explanation is made plausible by its premises in virtue of the generalization that
explanations of data that meet the criteria for argument to the best explanation are
generally correct.
MacPherson raises a number of difficulties with applying structural
equations modelling (SEM) semantics to determine whether a counter-factual
singular conditional is true. With respect to the hypothetical situation where
Vladimir Putin lives in the White House, he notes that there are other causal
pathways than the one on which I focus, including the pathway in which Putin takes
over the United States after a major war. This point seems perfectly correct. Perhaps
it is problematic in both possible-worlds semantics and SEM semantics to determine
whether Putin would live in Washington if he lived in the White House. And perhaps
the reason for the determination being so problematic lies in the unclarity of the
question. Intuitively, I for one am baffled about what to say if I were asked: If
Vladimir Putin lived in the White House, would he live in Washington, D.C.? I would
want more clarification: How are you supposing that the current President of Russia
would have come to live in the official residence of the President of the United
States? It seems that one can only give a determinate answer to the question with
any confidence if one knows the causal mechanisms by which Putin is supposed to
have come to live in the White House. If so, that is a vindication of SEM semantics,
since it is just the sort of information that SEM semantics needs for the evaluation of
counter-factual singular conditionals.
MacPherson raises as a difficulty for SEM semantics that it does not
straightforwardly apply to counter-factual conditionals in mathematics. Perhaps,
however, one can extend causal modelling to the modelling of non-causal
determination relations. I used the example of the counter-factual situation in which
a figure was a circle with non-zero radius and simultaneously a square with sides of
non-zero length. The situation is mathematically impossible, but intuitively one can
see that, if there were such a figure, it would necessarily have a non-zero area, but
would not necessarily have an area greater than nine square centimetres. Within an
extended SEM semantics, one might model the relation between the radius of a
circle and its area, as well as the relation between the length of the sides of a square
and its area, in terms of determination relations, which in each case would go in
each direction. So the graph would be cyclic (i.e. non-recursive).
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